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MISSOURI SECTION
COMMENTS
BROKERS-REVOCATION OF REAL-ESTATE BROKER'S LICENSE FOR
DISHONEST DEALINGS IN TRANSACTION NOT INVOLVING REAL ESTATE
Robinson v. Missouri Real Estate Comm'n, 280 S.W.2d 188
(Mo. App. 1955)
Appellant, a licensed real-estate broker, agreed to sell promissory
notes belonging to McCown, whom he had met in the course of real-
estate dealings. Appellant sold the notes for nearly $2,600, receiving
a certified check payable jointly to himself and McCown. After having
an employee endorse McCown's name to it, appellant cashed the check
and subsequently represented to McCown that he had sold the notes
for only $1,850. Discovering the fraud, McCown filed a complaint
with the Missouri Real Estate Commission. A hearing was called at
the conclusion of which appellant's license was revoked pursuant to
statutory provision for revocation of licenses when a broker commits
any of several enumerated acts relating to real-estate transactions, or
"any other conduct which constitutes... dishonest dealings ... ."', The
Kansas City Court of Appeals reversed the Commission's decision,
holding that "any other conduct" referred only to real-estate dealings,
and not to transactions for which a real-estate broker's license is not
required."
The great majority of states have enacted statutes providing for
licensure and delicensure of real-estate brokers. Most of these statutes
provide for revocation in the event that a broker is guilty of certain
enumerated acts when committed in the course of his real-estate deal-
ingsc A minority of the jurisdictions, however, have statutes similar
. b0. RnV. STAT. § 339.100(7) (1949). The defendant clearly was not engaged
io real-estate business in regard to this transaction. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 339.010(1949).
2. Robinson v. Missouri Real Estate Comm'n 280 S.W.2d 188 (Mo. App. 1955).3. These statutes are of two types. Most of the statutes provide that the license
may hwe revoked when the licensee is guilty of certain conduct proscribed in the
statute when performing "any of the acts mentioned herein." See e.g., D. C.
CD: ANN. § 45-1408 (1951) IOWA CoD ANN. c. 117, § 117.34 (1949). The
clause, "acts mentioned herein,' has been construed to include only those activities
which the statute was designed to cover, namely the acts of a real-estate broker
while engaged in real-estate business. See, e.g., therman v. Massachusetts Bond-
ing and Ins. Co., 41 A2d 844 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1945); Blakeley v. Miller,
232 Iowa 980, 7 N.W.2d 11 (1942).
The second group leaves no room for doubt; it expressly limits the grounds
for revocation to transactions occurring within the scope of the statutory duties
of a real-estate broker. See, e.g., ARIz. Cons ANN. § 67-1723 (Supp. 1951); CAL.
BUSINESS AND PROESSoNs COnE ANN. § 10176 (Supp. 1955).A few of these statutes provide for revocation if the licensee is convicted of
a felony even though not in the course of real-estate dealings. See, e.g., IL. RBv.
STT c. 1141, § 8(2) (1955); Nuv. Cour. LAws § 6396.20 (Supp. 1949).
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to that of Missouri, which includes not only an enumeration of acts
which specifically refer to real-estate transactions but also contains a
general provision proscribing "any other conduct" constituting dis-
honest dealings by the licensee.4 Clearly, when a real-estate broker has
committed some dishonest or fraudulent act which is not directly in-
volved in his real-estate dealings, his license will not be revoked under
the majority-type statute.5 Whether such unconnected act comes
within the "any other conduct" clause of the minority-type statute is
the issue presented by the principal case.
In reaching the instant decision thd court relied heavily upon the
cases of Blakeley v. Miller and Schomig v. Keiser,7 both of which held
that a broker's license cannot be revoked for misconduct while he is
acting outside the scope of his duties as a real-estate broker. Both of
these decisions, however, were based upon the majority-type statute
and thus were clearly of no value in interpreting the Missouri statute.8
The court also relied upon the doctrine of ejusdem generis under
which a general provision in a statute following specific provisions is
constructed narrowly so as to include only things of the same general
kind or class specifically mentioned in the preceding provisions.0
Since ten provisions of the Missouri statute covering revocation of
real-estate brokers' licenses related specifically to matters in the con-
duct of real-estate business, application of the ejusdem generis rule
would operate to limit the general clause to include only "any other
conduct" while acting in the sphere of real-estate business. The court,
however, could have applied the rule of expressio unius est exclusio
alterius. Under this rule an affirmative or negative enumeration in a
statute gives rise to an inference that all omissions were intended by
the legislature.0 The maxim is especially effective where that which is
provided for in one part of a statute is omitted from another." Appli-
cation of this rule to the Missouri statute would have meant that since
ten provisions specifically limit revocation of brokers' licenses to acts
committed in relation to real-estate transactions, the court would not
4. See, e.g., Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 324.160(k) (Baldwin 1955); Wis. STAT,
136.08 (k) (1953).
5. See notes 6 & 7 infra.
6. 232 Iowa 980, 7 N.W.2d 11 (1942).
7. 189 Cal. 596, 209 Pac. 550 (1922).
8. The Blakeley case was based upon a statute limiting the grounds for rev-
ocation to "acts mentioned herein," and the Schomig case was based upon a
statute which limited revocation to misconduct in carrying out activities within
the definition of a real-estate broker. See note 3 supra.
9. 2 SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 4909 (3d ed.
Horack 1943), and see the many cases stating and applying the rule at n.3. See
also Note, The Doctrine of Ejusdem Generis in Missouri, 1952 WASH. U.L.Q. 250.
10. 2 SUTHERLAND, op. cit. supra note 9, § 4915.
11. 2 id. § 4915 n.7. See United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76
(1820); Gruben v. Leebrick & Fisher, Inc., 32 Cal. App. 2d 762, 84 P.2d 1078(1938); New Haven v. Whitney, 36 Conn. 373 (1870); Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n
v. City of Spartanburg, 185 S.C. 313, 194 S.E. 139 (1937).
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have read into the general clause the limitation that "any other con-
duct" must occur while the broker is engaged in a real-estate transac-
tion. Under this interpretation no reason is perceived why appellant's
misconduct would not have been within the purview of the statute.
While no reason is given in the court's opinion as to why the
ejusdcm generis rule was applied,12 it seems likely that the court relied
sub silentio upon another familiar rule of statutory construction:
Penal statutes are to be construed most favorably to the accused.?
Delicensure statutes are considered penal in nature,' and it is the
operation of this rule which underlies the marked hesitancy of courts
to revoke licenses.5
It should be remembered, however, that the cardinal rule of con-
struction is to effectuate the legislative intent,16 and that all other
rules merely aid in the discovery of this intent. In determining the
intent of the legislature, it is not sufficient to argue that the clause
"any other conduct" is clear and unambiguous and in no way suggests
the limitation imposed by the court in the principal case, for the very
12. There are two opposing canons on almost every point of statutory con-
structron. In order, however, to persuade the court to adopt one or the other it
must be by means other than the use of the canon. In other words, a court will
not apply a rule solely for the sake of applying a rule. Llewellyn Remarks on
the Tthor o f Appellate Decision and the Rales or Canons About Yo-; Statutes
Are To &v Coastrued, 3 VAxn. L. Rnv. 395,401 (1950).
13. 2 SuTHnLA.ND, op. cit. supra note 9, § 3305 (The cases are "legion" which
support this pnnciple.); Hall, Strict or Liberal Construction of Penal Statutes,
48 HMv. L. rw. 748 (1985). See also HALL, GENERAL P Nc' as oF CRmZuAL
Lw 34 (1947); Quarles, Some Statutory Construction Problems and Approaches
in Urnw mat Law, 3 VAND. L. Rm. 531, 532 (1950).
There has been some dissatisfaction, however, with the rule requiring strictinterpietation of penal statutes and as a result many states have abrogated or
modified the rule by statute. These legislative attempts to change the old rule,however, have met with little success in the courts-only about half of these states
apply the modifying statutes with any consistency and the others ignore them
completely. 3 SUTUERAN, op. cit, spra note 9, § 5607 nn.8 & 9; Hall, Stri
or Liberal Construction of Penal Statutes, 48 HAzy. L. RBv. 748, 752-56 (1935).
Some courts, however, have abrogated the rule where the statute relates to par-
ticular subjects such as public health. Quarles, supra at 538.
While the Missouri legislature has annulled the rule of strict construction of
statutes in derogation of the common law, Me. B u. STAT. § 1.010 (1949), no
attempt has been made to modify the rule of strict interpretation of penal
statutes. For cases supporting the latter rule see Lynch v. Missouri K.T.F4R.,333 Me. 89, (At S.W.2d 918 (1933); Albers v. derchants' Exclange, 140 Mo. App.
446, 120 S.W. 139 (1909).
14. See Schomig v. Weiser, 189 Cal. 596, 209 Pa. 550 (1922); Blakeley v.
Miller, 232 Iowa 980, 7 N.W.2d 11 (1942) (stating that statutes authorizing
revocation of licenses are highly penal in nature). For a discussion of penal
statutes, see 2 SUTHERLAND, op. cit. supra note 9, § 3303-04.
15, Once a license has been issued, a court naturally will be slow in orderingits revocation, since the licensee is usually one who has invested much time, effort
and money in the establishment of his business or profession. In the prncipal
case, for example, the appellant had been licensed for seven years and employed
approximately twelve salesmen.
16. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. City of Spartanburg, 185 S.C. 313, 194 S.
139 (1937).
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use of the words "any other" introduces an element of uncertainty.7
It is submitted, however, that the holding of the principal case fails to
carry out the basic purpose of the statute. The regulation of real-es-
tate brokers is for the purpose of protecting the public. 8 Insofar as
the public is concerned, the primary safeguard against unscrupulous
real-estate brokers is that brokers be honest and trustworthy indi-
viduals. Therefore, when the conduct of a broker evinces a basic trait
of dishonesty or untrustworthiness, as in the principal case, the safety
of the public requires that his license be revoked.19 Thus, the license
would no longer serve as a means by which he could make new con-
tacts among members of the community whom he might later exploit,
be it through a real-estate or non-real-estate transaction. Moreover,
this interpretation of legislative intention is buttressed by the fact
that in order to obtain a real-estate broker's license, the applicant
must "bear . . . a good reputation for honesty, integrity, [and] fair
dealing... . ,2o It is difficult to accept the argument that while a gen-
eral character of honesty is required for procuring a license, such a
license, once issued, cannot be revoked for a showing of dishonesty un-
less such a showing occurs in a real-estate transaction.
17. The argument that words in a statute are clear and unambiguous has a
basic fallacy, i.e., words have meaning in and of themselves and are always un-
certain when used in statutes. 2 SUTHERLAND, op. cit. supra note 9 § 4502.
18. See, e.g., Marks v. Watson, 112 Cal. App. 2d 196, 200, 245 P.2d 1121, 1124(1952); Shelton v. McCarroll, 308 Ky. 288, 214 S.W.2d 396 (1948) (The court
held that the purpose of such a statute is to protect the public rather than to
raise revenue. Rejecting the argument that there was nothing in the business of
a real-estate broker which necessitated regulation in order to protect the health,
morals, or general welfare of the public, the court held that the statute was a
constitutional exercise of the police power of the state.). For cases holding that
the purpose of licensure in other occupations is to protect the public, see Cornell
v. Reilly, 127 Cal. App. 2d 178, 273 P.2d 572 (1954) (liquor dealers); Murrill v.
State Board of Accountancy, 97 Cal. App. 2d 709, 218 P.2d 569 (1950) (account-
ants); West Coast Home Improvement Co. v. Contractors' State License Board,
72 Cal. App. 2d 287, 164 P.2d 811 (1945) (contractors).
19. See Lauren W. Gibbs, Inc., v. Monson, 102 Utah 234, 129 P.2d 887 (1942).
From an order cancelling the license of a securities dealer on the ground that he
had demonstrated his untrustworthiness to transact the business of a dealer the
appellant contended that the statute was unconstitutional on the ground tha the
standard of trustworthiness was too indefinite and its application would depend
upon the whim of the commission. In rejecting this argument the court held that
the statute did not grant the commission authority to set any standard but rather
the commission had to decide whether defendant was untrustworthy to conduct
the business for which he was licensed. That untrustworthiness was to be judgedby the purpose of the statute, namely, to protect the public against fraudulent
schemes in securities. For example, said the court, if one so conducted himself,
in the sale of real estate or in his business relations generally, that he lived by
fraud and deception, such a showing would evince his unworthiness to sell
securities.
See also Goodley v. New Jersey Real Estate Comm'n, 29 N.J. Super. 178, 102A.2d 65 (1954) (revocation of license for a showing of untrustworthiness on the
part of the licensee while not acting solely as a real-estate broker).
20. Mo. Rav. STAT. § 339.040 (1949).
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